

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BELGRA 01584 01 OF 02 261524Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----046976 261532Z /45  
O 261356Z FEB 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5459

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 1584

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: YO, US  
SUBJ: THE TITO VISIT IN PERSPECTIVE

1. VERY LITTLE THAT AFFECTS THE FUTURE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES CAN BE PREDICTED WITH CONFIDENCE. BUT (AS IN SO MANY OTHER THINGS), YUGOSLAVIA IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE. WE CAN BE ABSOLUTELY POSITIVE OF ONE THING, AND REASONABLY CERTAIN OF ANOTHER:

-- THE CERTAINTY: DESPITE ALL THE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, JOSIP BROZ TITO WILL NOT LIVE FOREVER. INDEED, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL STILL BE AROUND WHEN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION LEAVES OFFICE.

-- THE PROBABILITY: THERE WILL FOLLOW IN THE WAKE OF TITO'S DEMISE A PERIOD OF INTERNAL UNCERTAINTY AND INTERNATIONAL TENSION IN THE HEART OF EUROPE, WITH THE EVER-PRESENT DANGER THAT UNCERTAINTY WILL DEGENERATE INTO CIVIL WAR AND TENSION ESCALATE TO CRISIS.

2. THESE TWO FACTORS -- THE CERTAINTY OF TITO'S DEATH AND ITS POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES -- MUST LIE AT THE HEART OF OUR THINKING ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. AND SINCE THE TITO VISIT WILL INEVITABLY INFLUENCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP, THESE FACTORS ARE RELEVANT TO THE TRIP AS WELL.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BELGRA 01584 01 OF 02 261524Z

3. THE KEY QUESTION IS NOT SO MUCH WHAT WE WILL DO WHEN OR AFTER TITO PASSES (IMPORTANT AS THAT IS), BUT WHAT WE CAN DO BEFORE HAND TO PUT OURSELVES IN A POSITION TO HAVE AS MUCH INFLUENCE AS POSSIBLE ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE POST-TITO PERIOD.

4. UNDER A WORST-CASE SCENARIO TITO'S DEATH COULD UNLEASH IMMEDIATELY, OR WITHIN A REASONABLY SHORT PERIOD, A CLASH AMONG YUGOSLAV NATIONALITIES, OR A VYING FOR POWER AMONG THE RESIDUAL LEADERSHIP, OR BOTH, THAT WOULD RESULT IN MASSIVE INSTABILITY. AND WHO COULD PREDICT WITH CONFIDENCE WHAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT, UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, BE TEMPTED, "INVITED," OR FEEL COMPELLED TO DO?

5. I MAKE NO CLAIM THAT THESE EVENTS WILL COME TO PASS. INDEED, I BELIEVE IT IMPROBABLE THAT THEY WILL. CERTAINLY THERE ARE OTHER LESS HORRENDOUS SCENARIOS THAT ARE MORE WITHIN THE REALM OF THE POSSIBLE. BUT SOME DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY AND INSTABILITY, EVEN IF ONLY OF A VERY TEMPORARY NATURE, IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN. AND IT IS DURING THAT PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY AND -- IF THE CRISIS PASSES UNEVENTFULLY -- THE INSTITUTION-BUILDING THAT WILL FOLLOW AFTER, THAT THE US CAN HAVE ITS GREATEST AND MOST PRODUCTIVE IMPACT. BUT WE WILL BE IN NO POSITION, AT THAT LATE DATE, TO INFLUENCE EVENTS OR FORESTALL MISTAKES UNLESS WE HAVE TAKEN FULL ADVANTAGE OF WHATEVER TIME WE STILL HAVE TO BUILD THE BRIDGES OF UNDERSTANDING, CONFIDENCE, AND -- MOST IMPORTANT -- COMMON INTEREST, THAT WILL GIVE US MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO THE FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA. THOSE WHO WILL LEAD, WHEN THE OLD MAN IS GONE, MUST NOT BE LEFT TO FEEL ISOLATED FROM THE WEST, OR THAT THE SOVIET UNION  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BELGRA 01584 01 OF 02 261524Z

IS THE ONLY NATION WHOSE INTERESTS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

6. NOR SHOULD WE LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE CHANCES ARE RELATIVELY GOOD AFTER TITO, FOR A SLOW TRANSFORMATION FROM WHAT MUST NOW BE CLASSED AS A REPRESSIVE (YET BY NO MEANS HIGHLY REPRESSIVE) REGIME. TITO HAS MOVED YUGOSLAVIA A LONG WAY FROM THE STALINIST STATE IT ONCE WAS; INDEED THE PROCESS OF LIBERALIZATION OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST 30 YEARS HAS BEEN REMARKABLE. BUT SO LONG AS HE REMAINS, THE PACE OF FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN THE RIGHTS ENJOYED BY YUGOSLAVS -- WHETHER HUMAN OR POLITICAL -- WILL BE STRICTLY LIMITED. HE IS TOO MUCH A PRODUCT OF HIS PAST, TOO MUCH A VICTIM OF THE CULT OF HERO-WORSHIP THAT HAS GROWN UP AROUND HIM, EVER TO PERMIT MUCH MORE FREEDOM THAN NOW EXISTS. BUT THE SEEDS HAVE BEEN PLANTED, AND THERE WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE SOCIETY, AFTER TITO DEPARTS, THAT WILL WANT TO MOVE TOWARD SOMETHING MORE AKIN TO THE REALITIES -- IF NOT THE FORMS -- OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY. THEY WILL NEED SUPPORT, ENCOURAGEMENT, ADVICE AND GUIDANCE. AND WE OUGHT TO BE AMONG THE FIRST TO WHOM THEY TURN, OUT OF A CONFIDENCE BORN OF

THE EXPERIENCE OF HAVING KNOWN AND WORKED WITH US IN  
THE TIME BEFORE TITO EXITED.

7. THESE NOT-SO-LONG-TERM AIMS ARE FAR EASIER TO  
DESCRIBE THAN TO ACHIEVE. BUT IF THEY MAKE SENSE, THEN  
OUR OBJECTIVE OUGHT TO BE TO DEFINE AND IMPLEMENT PROGRAMS  
THAT WILL BUILD A WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS WHICH WILL CREATE,  
FIRST, A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTERESTS AND ACTIONS  
OF EACH SIDE, FOLLOWED BY GROWING SHARED INTERESTS,  
THE LOSS OF WHICH WOULD BE PAINFUL TO BOTH PARTIES, AND,  
EVENTUALLY, ACCESS TO CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIETY  
THAT HAVE THUS FAR BEEN LARGELY CLOSED TO US (E.G., THE  
PARTY AND THE MILITARY).

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 BELGRA 01584 01 OF 02 261524Z

IM WE SHOULD, THEREFORE, TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE  
OPPORTUNITIES THE TITO VISIT OFFERS TO ESTABLISH THAT  
WEB OF RELATIONSHIPS. THE WORK IS ALREADY WELL BEGUN;  
THE MONTHS OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAVE SEEN A  
STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS TO A POINT WHERE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 BELGRA 01584 02 OF 02 261600Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----047012 261601Z /45

O 261356Z FEB 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5460

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 1584

EXDIS

THEY ARE AS GOOD AS THEY HAVE BEEN SINCE THE END OF  
WORLD WAR II. THE VISIT SHOULD BE SEEN AS AN AFFIRMATION  
OF THAT PROGRESS AND A COMMITMENT TO ITS CONTINUANCE.

TITO SHOULD RETURN HOME CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS A FRIEND, THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE IMPERATIVES OF YUGOSLAVIA'S PECULIAR INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE, AND SUPPORT ITS INDEPENDENCE AND NONALIGNMENT, EVEN THOUGH WE WILL SOMETIMES DISAGREE ON THE SPECIFIC POSITIONS THAT CIRCUMSTANCE AND YUGOSLAV PREJUDICES DICATE.

9. DURING THE VISIT WE SHOULD:

-- LISTEN WITH RESEPCT TO TITO'S THOUGHTS ON THE WORLD SCENE (WE MIGHT EVEN LEARN SOMETHING), GIVE HIM A CLEAR PICTURE OF WHAT IS ON OUR MIND, AND SEEK TO INFLUENCE HIM ON SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WHERE HE AND YUGOSLAVIA HAVE SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE, E.G., DISARMAMENT, THE MIDDLE EAST, KOREA. TITO RIGHTLY CONSIDERS HIMSELF A WORLD FIGURE AND STATESMAN AND WE OUGHT TO LET HIM KNOW WE SHARE HIS HIGH OPINION OF HIMSELF. PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTERS HAVE HAD AN ENORMOUSLY POSITIVE IMPACT AND HE SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE PRACTICE WILL CONTINUE.

-- RECOGNIZE YUGOSLAVIA'S ROLE AS A LEADER OF THE NONALIGNED AND USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THIS VISIT TO DEMONSTRATE US UNDERSTANDING OF THE STRENGTH AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BELGRA 01584 02 OF 02 261600Z

IMPORTANCE OF THAT MOVEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD UNDERLINE THAT: (A) RECENT SHIFTS IN U.S. POLICY ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE NONALIGNED WARRANT, EVEN MORE THAN BEFORE, A MORE POSITIVE AND BALANCED ATTITUDE ON THEIR PART TOWARD THE UNITED STATES; B) AS CONSULTATION BETWEEN US GROWS, SO CAN THERE BE A GROWING DEGREE OF COOPERATION IN RESOLVING THIRD-WORLD ISSUES AND IN FOSTERING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

-- GIVE HIM AND HIS ADVISORS A SENSE THAT WE ARE TRYING OUR BEST TO RESOLVE THE FEW BILATERAL ISSUES (KRSKO AND EXIM GUARANTEES) THAT STAND BETWEEN US, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME REMINDING THEM THAT COMPROMISE IS A TWO-WAY STREET.

10. ALL OF THE ABOVE IS IMPORTANT IN SETTING THE STAGE FOR POST-VISIT PROGRESS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TIES THAT LINK YUGOSLAVIA MORE CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED STATES. FOREMOST AMONG THESE IS SUBSTANTIAL ROOM FOR A MUTUALLY PROFITABLE EXPANSION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT. THE YUGOSLAVS ARE ANXIOUS TO REDUCE THEIR HEAVY RELIANCE ON THE SOVIET UNION AND TO COMPENSATE WHERE THEY CAN FOR THEIR SERIOUS TRADE IMBALANCE WITH THE COMMON MARKET. THEY SEE THE US AS THEIR MOST PROMISING ALTERNATIVE, AND WE SHOULD DO ALL WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE AND FOSTER A SHIFT IN OUR DIRECTION.

11. OF ALMOST EQUAL IMPORTANCE, BUT FAR LESS AMENABLE TO

EASY SOLUTION, IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA -- PARTICULARLY ARMS SALES. OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS OUR SALES HAVE BEEN VIRTUALLY NONEXISTENT; OUR CONTACTS WITH THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY (A CRITICAL ELEMENT IN THE POST-TITO TRANSITION PERIOD) ONLY SLIGHTLY BETTER. PRESIDENT  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BELGRA 01584 02 OF 02 261600Z

CARTER'S DECISION TO PERMIT A "MODEST" EXPANSION OF OUR SALES PROGRAM, AND SECRETARY BROWN'S SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO BELGRADE, MARKED A NEW PHASE IN THE RELATIONSHIP -- ONE WHICH HAS ALREADY LED TO SOME NEW SALES AND A MARGINAL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY. BUT THE PROGRAM IS STILL PLAGUED BY BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA AND DISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES -- FACTORS WHICH A SUCCESSFUL VISIT SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO RESOLVE.

12. AND FINALLY, THE VISIT CAN GIVE A MAJOR IMPETUS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACTS BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADERS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEES HAVE INVITED A DELEGATION OF YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS TO VISIT THE US LATER THIS YEAR -- A FIRST. BUT THE INVITATION TOOK GREAT EFFORT TO ARRANGE, AND MUTUAL SUSPICION, I SUSPECT, WILL BE HIGH. THE TITO VISIT SHOULD MAKE EACH SIDE MORE RESPECTABLE IN THE EYES OF THE OTHER, THEREBY ENCOURAGING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REAL DIALOGUE AND A CONTINUING EXCHANGE.

13. THE QUESTION OF SUSPICION MAY, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, BE THE REAL ROADBLOCK THAT MUST BE OVERCOME IF OUR RELATIONS ARE TO PROSPER OVER THE LONGER TERM. YUGOSLAVIA IS LED, AFTER ALL, BY A GENERATION OF COMMUNISTS WHO FOUGHT A WAR AND DIED FOR THEIR BELIEFS; MEN WHO, SOON AFTERWARD, ONLY RELUCTANTLY AND AFTER GREAT SOUL-SEARCHING CHOSE TO ACCEPT MOSCOW'S EXCOMMUNICATION RATHER THAN CHANGE THEIR WAYS; MEN WHO FOR A LONG TIME, IN THEIR HEART-OF-HEARTS, LONGED TO BE REACCEPTED INTO THE BODY OF THE FAITHFUL (BUT ON THEIR OWN TERMS). AND WE, IN THEIR EYES, ARE THE BULWARK OF CAPITALISM, THE FORTRESS OF ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION, AND THE LAST DEFENDER OF A DYING COLONIALISM.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 BELGRA 01584 02 OF 02 261600Z

14. ADDMITTEDLY, TIMES HAVE CHANGED. UNLIKE WHICHEVER  
LOUIS IT WAS, THE YUGOSLAV LEADERSHIP HAS LEARNED SOMETHING.  
BUT IT HAS FORGOTTEN VERY LITTLE. THE  
EMOTIONAL PULL OF THE SOVIETS HAS LESSENED, THE GROWTH OF  
EUROCOMMUNISM HAS REDUCED THE SENSE OF ISOLATION. THE  
UNITED STATES DOES NOT POST THE EVER-PRESENT MILITARY  
THREAT THE SOVIETS DO; WE CAN BE USED, WE ARE GENERALLY  
RESPECTED AND OFTEN ENVIED, BUT WE ARE NOT WIDELY TRUSTED.  
IN THE END THE SAVING ELEMENT IS THAT THEY ARE ALL BETTER  
YUGOSLAVS THAN COMMUNISTS. AS SUCH, THEIR OWN INTERESTS  
AS THEY PERCEIVE THEM WILL GUIDE THEIR DECISIONS (WHICH  
MAKES THEM VERY LIKE ALL THE REST OF US). IT IS OUR  
JOB, THEN, SLOWLY TO PERSUADE THEM OF THE COMMUNITY  
OF OUR INTERESTS. WE HAVE MADE A REMARKABLY GOOD  
START OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR; THE TASK NOW  
IS TO TRANSFORM A PROMISING BEGINNING INTO A LASTING  
SUCCESS.  
EAGLEBURGER

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic DecapTIONing:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** REPORTS, BRIEFING MATERIALS, POLITICAL SITUATION, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, DEATHS, ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 26 feb 1978  
**DecapTION Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**DecapTION Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978BELGRA01584  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780089-0117  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** BELGRADE  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780212/aaaaajlu.tel  
**Line Count:** 296  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** f5e221cf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 09 jun 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3471816  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** THE TITO VISIT IN PERSPECTIVE  
**TAGS:** PINT, PEPR, PGOV, YO, US, (TITO, JOSIP BROZ)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/f5e221cf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014